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Abstract: We develop a perpetual youth model to investigate how longevity af-
fects economic growth and welfare. Life expectancy is determined by individuals’
investments in healthcare. We ﬁnd that improvements in the healthcare technol-
ogy always increase the steady state growth rate. Although the eﬀect is small,
even for large increases in longevity, welfare gains may be substantial depending
on the type of the technological improvement. We identify two externalities as-
sociated with healthcare investments and provide a condition when healthcare
expenditures are ineﬃciently low in the market equilibrium. Finally, we discuss
our results with respect to alternative spillover speciﬁcations in the production
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Over the last decades human longevity has increased substantially. Higher expected lifetime
has been accompanied, at least in the developed world, by a signiﬁcant rise of healthcare
expenditures. For example, between 1960 and 2000 life expectancy in the U.S. rose from
69.8 to 77.1 years, while health expenditures, as a share of GDP, increased from 5.2%
to 13.4% (according to OECD data). Even though empirical evidence on the relationship
between health expenditures and life expectancy is ambiguous, there is no doubt that ex-
pected lifetime is not given per se but can be inﬂuenced by investments in healthcare, such
as improving sanitation, buying medication and inoculation, consulting a physician, etc.
(Lichtenberg 2004, Cutler et al. 2006, Hall and Jones 2007, Caliskan 2009).
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between endogenous investments in longevity,
economic growth and welfare. Therefore, we develop a model that combines the household
side of perpetual youth models in the tradition of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) with
the production side of an endogenous growth model in the style of Romer (1986). The key
novelty in our model is a healthcare sector that allows individuals to reduce their risk of
dying by purchasing health services. Thus, instead of varying longevity exogenously, we
focus on how economic growth and welfare reacts to endogenous changes in life expectancy
induced by improvements in the healthcare technology.1 In fact, we consider two diﬀerent
types of healthcare improvements. The ﬁrst type decreases the baseline mortality, which is
independent of individual investments in healthcare. One could think of improvements in
the sanitary infrastructure or behavioral changes such as reduced smoking. The second type
increases the marginal productivity of healthcare expenditures. Examples include better
medication or therapeutic breakthroughs, such as new diagnostic tools or surgeries.
In our standard model speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that improvements in the healthcare technology
always lead to higher steady state growth rates. Intuitively, higher life expectancy increases
the share of old (“rich”) relative to young (“poor”) households and leads ceteris paribus
to higher capital per capita accumulation. However, our numerical calculations suggest
that the eﬀect on the growth rate is rather small. Yet, higher life expectancy may yield
considerable welfare gains. The type of healthcare improvements matters, however. For a
given increase in longevity, welfare improvements are substantially higher if higher longevity
is induced by improvements of the ﬁrst type (baseline mortality decreases) compared to
improvements of the second type (higher eﬃciency of healthcare treatment). Using the data
set of Becker et al. (2005) amended by data on healthcare expenditures, we obtain higher
1 Our model emphasizes that increases in healthcare expenditures and longevity are mainly driven by the
availability of better healthcare technologies. Newhouse (1992), Cutler et al. (2006) and Fonseca et al.
(2009), among others, support this view. Alternative explanations focus on income eﬀects (Hall and Jones
2007) or greater health-insurance coverage.
1welfare improvements than Becker et al. (2005) in low developed regions, where healthcare
improvements were predominantly of the ﬁrst type, and lower welfare improvements in
highly developed regions, where longevity increases were mainly triggered by healthcare
improvements of the second type.
We identify two externalities associated with healthcare investments. The ﬁrst, which is well
known (see, for example, Philipson and Becker 1998), stems from the price taking behavior of
households with respect to annuities and leads to over-investment in healthcare. The second
externality is a consequence of our growth model. Households under-invest in healthcare,
as they do not take into account that increased longevity on the aggregate level induces a
positive eﬀect on the economy’s growth rate. We show that healthcare investments in the
market equilibrium cannot be ineﬃciently high and give a condition under which they are
ineﬃciently low.
Finally, we emphasize the importance of the spillover speciﬁcation in the production sec-
tor for the growth eﬀects of healthcare investments. Generalizing the speciﬁcation of the
spillover eﬀect in our basic model set-up, we show that when technological improvements
trigger higher healthcare expenditures, longevity increases may even lead to negative growth
and welfare eﬀects. By contrast, increases in expected lifetime enjoyed without healthcare
expenditures always induce positive growth and welfare eﬀects independent of the spillover
speciﬁcation. This further highlights the importance of the source of longevity increases.
Our paper combines three strands of the literature. The ﬁrst is the literature on the willing-
ness to pay for lower mortality risk including Grossman (1972), Arthur (1981), Shepard and
Zeckhauser (1984), Rosen (1988), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), Murphy and Topel (2003).
These papers study the trade-oﬀ of an individual household between consumption and
longevity, but do not consider the eﬀects on economic growth and also neglect potential ex-
ternalities of healthcare expenditures.2 A standard result in this literature is that healthcare
investments decrease in the household’s intertemporal substitution elasticity. The reason is
that there exists a trade-oﬀ between the quality (consumption level) and the quantity of life
(length of life). The household is the more willing to sacriﬁce current consumption in order
to increase its lifetime the stronger are the diminishing returns from consumption (i.e., the
more concave is the instantaneous utility function). We ﬁnd that this trade-oﬀ between the
quality and the quantity of life is only present if the households’ consumption elasticities are
low but vanishes if consumption elasticities are higher. Households with high consumption
elasticities invest more in their longevity with the aim to maximize their quality of life,
2 The latter is examined by Kuhn et al. (2010) who explicitly account for negative externalities such as
congestion of medical facilities or positive spillovers of preventive activities. By contrast, the externalities
in our paper are induced by households not taking into account the aggregate eﬀects of health expenditures
on annuity returns and the economy’s growth rate.
2i.e. their level of lifetime consumption. The reason is that when the households also decide
on capital savings, the consumption proﬁle for a given lifetime becomes steeper for higher
intertemporal substitution elasticities. This gives an incentive to live longer to enjoy more
periods with high consumption levels. Thus, the relationship between healthcare expendi-
tures and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is U-shaped rather than monotonically
declining.
The second strand is the literature on the growth eﬀects of increased life expectancy. By
now, there exists a considerably body of literature that examines exogenous variations in
expected lifetime on economic development (see, for example, de la Croix and Licandro 1999,
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2000, Zhang et al. 2001 Kalemli-Ozcan 2002, Azomahou et al. 2009,
Prettner 2010). However, we are aware of only three other papers which consider endogenous
expected lifetime in the sense that healthcare investments are directly chosen either by the
government or the individual household.3 Chakraborty and Das (2005) examine the eﬀects
of endogenous longevity choices on inequality, Bhattacharya and Qiao (2006) argue that the
presence of public input in private longevity may lead to chaotic dynamics in a neoclassical
growth model, and Finlay (2006) investigates individuals’ incentives to invest in human
capital and higher expected lifetime dependent on the agents’ degree of risk aversion. In
contrast to these papers, we investigate the growth eﬀects of changes in the healthcare
technology rather than assuming a static one. In addition, these contributions employ a two
period overlapping generations model, where households have a certain probability to live
in the second period and growth is driven by human capital, while we consider a continuous
time perpetual youth model. This allows us to connect to the ﬁrst strand of the literature
mentioned above in a natural way.
Finally, our numerical exercises are closely related to the papers on the welfare consequences
of increased longevity by Becker et al. (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2010). They neglect
eﬀects of longevity on (consumption) growth in their welfare estimations. Our basic model
set-up supports such an approach, as growth eﬀects of longevity are rather small. However,
we emphasize that reasonable changes in the speciﬁcation of spillover eﬀects may yield
growth eﬀects of increased longevity that substantially (and negatively) aﬀect welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and provides a
detailed discussion of the household’s maximization problem with respect to healthcare.
Section 3 determines the market equilibrium and derives the dynamics of the aggregate
3 Other papers including Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Aisa and Pueyo (2004) and Chakraborty (2004)
endogenize the individual’s life expectancy which, however, is not chosen fully independently. More re-
motely related to our paper is the literature on the eﬀect of health expenditures on growth in the presence
of epidemics such as AIDS (Bell et al. 2006, Bell and Gersbach 2009). In these papers health expendi-
tures may have a substantial eﬀect on longevity and growth by alleviating or eliminating the negative
consequences of the epidemic.
3economy. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ and the relationship
between healthcare expenditures and the economy’s age structure. We investigate the eﬀects
of improvements in the healthcare technology on the economy’s steady state dynamics and
provide numerical examples that illustrate the growth and welfare eﬀects in Section 6. In
Section 7, we identify the externalities of the market equilibrium. Section 8 extends the
analysis to diﬀerent spillover speciﬁcations. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
The model comprises a continuum of households. Like in Blanchard (1985), households born
at time s ∈ (−∞,∞) face a hazard rate p(s) of dying that is constant throughout the lifetime
of each household. In our model, however, the hazard rate may vary among households of
diﬀerent cohorts, as it is determined by the level of medical treatment the household gets
throughout its lifetime. At time of birth, households choose a level of medical treatment






As the hazard rate is constant over the entire lifetime, all households born at time s and








Although the lifetime of each household is stochastic, we assume that the size of each cohort
is large enough for cohort sizes to decline deterministically over time. At all times a new
cohort is born. We abstract from fertility choices of households and assume that cohort size
grows at the constant and exogenously given rate ν.4 Normalizing the cohort size at time




exp[νs]exp[−p(s)(t − s)]ds . (2)
Households exhibit identical ex ante preferences and face equal hazard rates for the same lev-
els of medical treatment. Households born at time s maximize expected discounted lifetime

















4 The parameter ν can be mapped into the economy’s fertility rate, which speciﬁes how many children are
born on average by each woman (or by our abstract genderless individual). The fertility rate is independent





denotes the instantaneous utility derived from consumption c(t,s) at time
t of the household born at time s, and ρ is the constant rate of time preference. We impose
standard curvature properties on the instantaneous utility function (V ′ > 0 and V ′′ < 0).
Rosen (1988) showed that optimal investments in healthcare crucially depend on two char-
acteristics of the instantaneous utility function: (i) the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion and (ii) the diﬀerence in instantaneous utility between being alive and dead. As our
deﬁnition of lifetime utility (3) normalizes instantaneous utility of being dead to zero, a
utility representation with V (c) > 0 for all c > 0 avoids that households may wish to be
rather dead than alive. As a consequence, we employ an instantaneous utility function with










, σ > 1 . (4)
At any time alive households are endowed with one unit of labor each that is supplied
inelastically to the labor market at wage w(t). In addition, households can save and borrow
assets b(t,s) at the interest rate r(t). Households are born without assets and we assume
that they can contract against the risk of leaving unanticipated requests on a perfectly
competitive life insurance market. Each unit of assets buys a life annuity paying the return
a as long as the household is alive. We further assume that the insurance company can
learn the probability of dying p(s) of each cohort at no costs. Due to the large cohort sizes
insurance companies can oﬀer risk free annuities. Perfect competition among insurance
companies leads to fair annuity payments a(t,s) = r(t) + p(s). In line with Philipson and
Becker (1998) and Eeckhoudt and Pestieau (2008), among others, we assume that households
take a(t,s) as given. Given that negative bequests are prohibited, households hold their










, t ≥ s , (5)
with b(s,s) = 0.
The economy comprises two production sectors: the consumption-good and the healthcare
sector. We assume that both sectors operate at perfectly competitive conditions. As all ﬁrms
have access to the same constant returns to scale production technologies, we restrict the






σ /(1 − 1/σ) + α
with some positive constant α. This allows either to employ intertemporal substitution elasticities of σ < 1
(Hall and Jones 2007) or to calibrate the model to diﬀerent values of a statistical life without changing the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Becker et al. 2005, Hall and Jones 2007). We use the functional
form (4) representing homothetic preferences which allow for a balanced growth path.
5analysis to one representative ﬁrm in each sector.
2.1 Consumption-good production
The representative ﬁrm in the consumption-good sector produces a homogeneous consump-
tion good, that can also be used as physical capital, via a Cobb-Douglas production technol-
ogy Y (t) ≡ K(t)α 
A(t)LF(t)
 1−α, where α ∈ (0,1) and K(t) and LF(t) denote the aggregate
amount of capital and labor employed in consumption-good production, respectively. A(t)
characterizes the technological level of the economy that is exogenous to the representative
ﬁrm. We assume a “learning-by-investing” externality similar to Romer (1986) but corrected
for scale eﬀects: A(t) ≡ K(t)/LF(t).6 Capital depreciates at the constant rate δ. Proﬁt max-
imization of the representative ﬁrm yields factor prices equal to the marginal productivities
r(t) = α − δ , (6a)




As the interest rate is constant due to the “learning-by-investing” externality, we introduce
the notation r ≡ r(t) = α − δ and a(s) ≡ a(s,t) = r + p(s).
2.2 Healthcare sector
The representative ﬁrm in the healthcare sector provides medical treatment by employing
labor. Without loss of generality, we assume that one unit of labor produces one unit of
medical treatment. Given the levels h(s) of medical treatment of each cohort alive, the total




h(s)exp[νs]exp[−p(s)(t − s)]ds . (7)
In the labor market equilibrium, labor employed in the healthcare sector has to earn the same
wage as labor employed in the consumption-good sector. As a consequence, the healthcare





for the costs of medical treatment of a household born at time s.
6 In Romer (1986) it is assumed that A(t) ≡ K(t). By specifying the learning externality to be proportional
to capital per worker, we correct for scale eﬀects.









≡ pmax − ψh(s) . (8)
Without medical treatment (h = 0) households face the hazard rate p(s) = pmax of dying.
The hazard rate p(s) decreases with constant returns ψ in the level of medical treatment
h(s). The parameter ψ < pmax reﬂects the productivity of healthcare investments and may
be interpreted as the quality level of the health system or the state of the art in medical
treatment. It denotes the maximum amount by which one may reduce the hazard rate
against pmax by spending all wage income on healthcare. While pmax reﬂects, for example,
the sanitary infrastructure of the economy, ψ increases with the human capital of physicians,
the eﬃciency of hospitals and the like.
Improvements in the healthcare technology may come in two qualitatively diﬀerent ways.
First, the maximal hazard rate pmax may decrease implying that all households, indepen-
dently of their levels of healthcare spending, experience a lower hazard rate of dying. In
fact, a decrease in pmax oﬀers higher life expectancy for free (at least for the individual
household). Historic examples in this respect could be new knowledge about germ theory
leading to better hygienic standards and a change in personal behavior. We also interpret
the introduction of most vaccines and drugs as a decrease in pmax, because these drugs
are usually not very expensive. As an example, think of penicillin which led to substantial
declines in mortality in the last century. Second, the state of the art in medical treatment
ψ may increase implying that the same amount of healthcare spending reduces the hazard
rate more than before. However, only households with positive healthcare spending beneﬁt
from the improved healthcare technology. One may think of improvements such as magnetic
resonance imaging, coronary heart bypass grafting, transplantation, and the like.7 In Sec-
tions 6 and 8 we shall see that these two channels of healthcare technology improvements
diﬀerently aﬀect the economy’s growth rate and the households’ lifetime utility.





= h(s)w(t) into the households’ budget constraint (5) yields




w(t) − c(t,s) , t ≥ s . (9)
7 Although it makes perfect sense to distinguish conceptionally the two diﬀerent channels of improvements in
the healthcare technology, we want to emphasize that most real world improvements impact simultaneously
on pmax and ψ. For example, knowledge about germ theory led to better hygienic standards not only in
every day life, thereby decreasing pmax, but also in medical treatment, which increased ψ.
7Thus, we can interpret the level of medical treatment h(s) as the fraction of labor income a
household spends throughout its entire life for healthcare services. This implies h(s) ∈ [0,1],
as households are born without assets and must not be indebted when dying.
Households maximize expected intertemporal utility (3) subject to conditions (9) and b(s,s) =
0 by choosing an optimal level of medical treatment h(s) and an optimal consumption path
c(t,s). To solve this maximization problem we interpret it as a sequence of two maximiza-
tion problems. The ﬁrst is to ﬁnd the optimal consumption path for some given level of
healthcare expenditures c⋆(t,s,h). We obtain the second maximization problem by insert-
ing c⋆(t,s,h) back into the expected intertemporal utility function (3) and solve for the
optimal healthcare expenditures h⋆(s).
Assuming a given level of medical treatment h(s), which implies a given hazard rate p(s)
via the healthcare technology (8), the ﬁrst maximization problem yields the Euler equation
˙ c(t,s)
c(t,s)
= σ[a(s) − ρ − p(s)] , t ≥ s . (10)
For given h(s) the behavior of a household born at time s is characterized by the system
of diﬀerential equations (9) and (10), the initial condition b(s,s) = 0 and the transversality
condition for the stock of assets limt→∞ b(t,s)exp[−a(s)(t − s)] = 0. Under the assumptions




> 0 and the long-run growth rate of wages w(t) is smaller






















(1 − σ)a(s) + σ
 
ρ + p(s)






t w(t′)exp[−a(s)(t′ − t)]dt′ denotes the expected net present value of
the household’s future labor income at time t.
We now turn to the second maximization problem. Given an optimal consumption path




, the necessary condition for the optimal level
8 Without these assumptions, the household’s problem is not well deﬁned. We shall see in Section 3 that
the condition that the long-run growth rate of wages w(t) is smaller than a(s) always holds in the market
equilibrium.





































For an interior solution the equality sign holds, while the inequality sign applies in case of the
corner solution h(s) = 0. The intuition for this condition is straightforward. In the optimum
the decrease in expected lifetime utility from a marginal increase of healthcare expenditures
due to decreasing lifetime consumption has to equal the increase in expected lifetime utility
due to an increasing expected lifetime. If the marginal beneﬁts of an investment in healthcare
do not outweigh the corresponding costs for any level of healthcare expenditures, the optimal
level of healthcare is given by the corner solution h(s) = 0.9










(1 − σ)a(s) + σ
 
ρ + p(s)
   −
1
1 − h(s)
≤ 0 . (13)
This determines a unique optimal level of healthcare expenditures h⋆(s).
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness of household optimum)








σψ − (σ − 1)[(1 − σ)a(s) + σ(ρ + pmax)]
σψ(2 − σ)
 
, if σ < 2 ,
0 , if σ ≥ 2 .
In the proof of Proposition 1, provided in the appendix, we show that there is no interior
solution for σ ≥ 2. The corner solution h(s) = 1 cannot be optimal, as this implies no
consumption and zero lifetime utility, while both are positive for any other value h(s) ∈ [0,1).
As a consequence, the corner solution h(s) = 0, i.e. no healthcare expenditures, is the
optimal solution. For σ < 2, there exists a local maximum, which is the optimal solution if
it occurs in the feasible range h(s) ∈ [0,1). Otherwise again the corner solution h(s) = 0 is
optimal.
9 In the ﬁrst-order condition (12), the trade-oﬀ between investments in healthcare and average lifetime
involves not only marginal but also absolute welfare comparisons. This illustrates the importance of the
diﬀerence in instantaneous utility between being alive and dead, as mentioned earlier.
93 Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Dynamics
To investigate the aggregate economy, we introduce aggregate household variables per capita




−∞ z(t,s)exp[νs]exp[−p(t − s)]ds
N(t)
, (14)
where z(t) and z(t,s) denote aggregate per capita respectively individual household vari-
ables.10 The economy consists of ﬁve markets: the labor market, the capital market, the
consumption good market, the market for annuities and the market for healthcare. We as-
sume the economy to be in market equilibrium at all times t. In particular, this implies
that labor demand equals the population size, LF(t)+LH(t) = N(t) and capital per capita
equals aggregate assets per capita, k(t) = b(t).
As the interest rate r is constant, the equilibrium on the market for annuities, a(s) = r+p(s),
implies that the ﬁrst-order condition (13) is identical for all households irrespective of their
date of birth. Consequently, all households spend the same fraction h(s) = h of income for
medical treatment implying that the hazard rate p(s) = p and the population growth rate
˙ N(t)/N(t) = ν are also constant. By setting a ≡ r+p, we obtain for the optimal healthcare








(σ − 1)[(1 − σ)r + σρ + pmax]
ψ
 
, if σ < 2 ,
0 , if σ ≥ 2 .
(15)
Via the healthcare technology (8), the optimal level of healthcare expenditures h⋆ in the
market equilibrium, which is completely determined by the set of exogenous parameters,
maps into the optimal hazard rate p⋆. Introducing the abbreviation11
x(p) ≡ (1 − σ)a(s) + σ(ρ + p) = r + p − σ(r − ρ) > 0 , (16)
which reﬂects the diﬀerence between the return on annuities r+p and the growth rate of the
households’ consumption σ(r − ρ), we can characterize the aggregate dynamics dependent
on the hazard rate p.
10 We are aware of the slight abuse of notation, which we consider to be justiﬁed to keep notation at a
minimum.
11 Note that x(p) > 0 is necessary for the household’s maximization problem to be well deﬁned.
10Proposition 2 (Aggregate system dynamics)
(i) The dynamics of the aggregate economy is characterized by:
˙ c(t) = σ(r − ρ)c(t) − (p + ν)x(p)k(t) , (17a)
˙ k(t) = (1 − δ − ν)k(t) − c(t) . (17b)
(ii) The dynamics of the aggregate economy is governed by a balanced growth path, i.e.
aggregate consumption c(t) and aggregate capital k(t) are growing at the same constant
rate g. The sign of the growth rate g is determined by
g T 0 ⇔ x(p)(p + ν) S σ(r − ρ)(1 − δ − ν) .
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that we neglect trivial steady states where c(t) =
k(t) = 0, for all t. The proposition establishes that there is a unique balanced growth path





1 + σ(r − ρ) − δ − ν −
  
1 − δ − ν − σ(r − ρ)
 2 + 4x(p)(p + ν)
 
. (18)
Inserting the optimal hazard rate in the market equilibrium yields the growth rate in the
market equilibrium g⋆ = g(p⋆). Thus, the aggregate system dynamics is fully characterized
by the set (h⋆,p⋆,g⋆).
4 The quality-quantity trade-oﬀ
The literature on the value of life and the willingness to pay for lower mortality risk em-
phasizes that the value of the intertemporal substitution parameter is of key importance for
understanding trade-oﬀs between the quantity and quality of life (see, for example, Arthur
1981, Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984, Rosen 1988, 1994, Ehrlich and Chuma 1990). A stan-
dard result of this literature is that the value of increases in longevity declines monotonically
with the intertemporal substitution elasticity σ. In our growth model, however, the equilib-
rium healthcare expenditures follow a U-shaped curve in σ, as shown in the next proposition
and explained in the subsequent paragraphs.
Proposition 3 (Eﬀect of σ on optimal healthcare)
For an interior market equilibrium, the optimal level of healthcare h⋆(s) follows a U-shaped
curve in σ. Formally
dh⋆(s)
dσ
S 0 ⇔ σ S 1 +
ρ + pmax − ψ
2(r − ρ)
.
11Proof: The claim follows directly by diﬀerentiating the interior solution for h⋆ in (15) with
respect to σ. 
The intuition for Proposition 3 is that there exist two motives for healthcare investments
that depend diﬀerently on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ. First, consider the
household could not save but only spend labor income on either consumption or healthcare
investments. Then, the household invests more in healthcare, the lower is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution σ. To see this, recall that instantaneous utility (4) is more concave,
the smaller is σ. In fact, for σ close to one instantaneous utility is insensitive to changes in
the consumption level. As a consequence, the household has an incentive to invest in the
quantity of life in order to spread out consumption over more periods, thereby counteracting
the strong diminishing returns of instantaneous utility with respect to consumption. If σ
becomes larger, instantaneous utility becomes more sensitive to changes in the consumption
level, i.e. the quality of life becomes more important. As a consequence, the household invests
less in healthcare, thereby enjoying higher levels of consumption over a shorter lifetime.
Second, if households can also save income in order to reap capital rents, the relationship
between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ and the investments in healthcare is
no longer monotonically decreasing but U-shaped. The reason is that now σ also inﬂuences
the growth rate of consumption. The household smoothes consumption less the higher is σ
leading to a higher growth rate of consumption σ(r−ρ). As the level of consumption becomes
more relevant the higher is σ, living longer can increase the expected lifetime utility if the
consumption loss in early periods is outweighed by the consumption gain in later periods.
In summary, there are two motives for households to invest in healthcare. The ﬁrst is
to spread out consumption over time to counteract the diminishing returns of instaneous
utility. It is decreasing in σ and particularly strong for low values of σ. The second motive
is to maximize total lifetime consumption, i.e. the total quality of life. This motive exploits
the fact that the consumption levels increase over time and an additional period of life
comes with high levels of consumption. This motive is increasing in σ and particulary
strong for high values of σ. For small values of σ the ﬁrst motive outweighs the second,
leading to a declining relationship between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
healthcare expenditures. Eventually, the second motive dominates the ﬁrst and investments
into healthcare increase with σ. While the ﬁrst motive is well understood (see, for example,
the references mentioned at the beginning of this section), the second motive can only
be captured if households simultaneously decide on consumption, savings, and healthcare
12investments and if r > ρ.12
Using (18), the following proposition investigates how the economy’s growth rate is aﬀected
by diﬀerent values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ.
Proposition 4 (Eﬀect of σ on growth rate)
For interior levels of healthcare in the market equilibrium, if σ < 1+(ρ+pmax−ψ)/[2(r−ρ)],
implying dh⋆/dσ < 0, the sign of dg⋆/dσ is ambiguous. Otherwise, dg⋆/dσ > 0.
The proof is given in the appendix. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ exerts
two opposing eﬀects on the growth rate. First, the direct eﬀect of an increase in σ for given
hazard rate p is positive: everything else equal, households save more the higher is σ resulting
in an increasing growth rate. The indirect eﬀect of σ via the households’ optimal choice of
healthcare expenditures h⋆ is ambiguous. If the indirect eﬀect is negative, which is the case
if h⋆ is decreasing in σ, then the overall eﬀect is ambiguous. Otherwise the economy’s growth
rate is increasing with σ.
5 Age Structure of the Economy
We now turn to the eﬀects of the growth rate of the cohort size ν and the hazard rate
p on the economy’s growth rate g. To sharpen intuition, consider an identical model but
with a standard inﬁnitely lived Ramsey consumer instead of ﬁnitely lived individuals on
the household side. Then, the system dynamics were characterized by ˙ c(t) = σ(r − ρ)c(t)
and (17b). Consequently, the economy’s growth rate would neither depend on ν and p. The
overlapping generations structure of our model is captured by the term (p + ν)x(p)k(t)
in equation (17a), which reﬂects the population-weighted diﬀerence between per capita
consumption and the consumption of the newly born individuals at time t. To see this,























where the left-hand side reﬂects the marginal cost of longevity and the right-hand side the beneﬁts.
Neglecting the identical terms in front of the brackets, we can observe that the relative marginal costs
(the expression in brackets on the left-hand side) does not depend on σ. The relative marginal beneﬁts of
longevity (the expression in brackets on the right-hand side) decrease with σ for low values of σ and then
increase at higher σ-values, thereby reﬂecting the two investment motives for longevity. If r = ρ, x(p) is
independent of σ and consequently the second motive vanishes. Then, the willingness to pay for a longer
life only depends on the monotonically declining term σ/(σ − 1), as in Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984).
Relaxing the assumption r = ρ in Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) should uncover the second motive for
investments to prolong life. We also expect the second motive to be present in Ehrlich (2000). However,
the comparative statics with respect to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution assume an exogenously
given wealth level, thereby excluding this motive.
13diﬀerentiate the aggregation rule (14) and insert equations (10) and (17a) yielding
(p + ν)[c(t) − c(t,t)] = (p + ν)x(p)k(t) . (19)
Thus, (p + ν)x(p)k(t) reﬂects the economy’s age structure. When p decreases, the share of
older households rises. Ceteris paribus, this leads to higher capital per capita and, as can be
inferred from (18), to a higher growth rate of the economy. Further, (18) indicates that the
growth eﬀect of the age structure is independent of the interest rate r. An increase in the
growth rate of the cohort size ν leads to a larger share of (“poor”) young households relative
to old (“rich”) ones implying, ceteris paribus, lower values of capital per capita. Thus, the
economy’s growth rate depends negatively on the long-run population growth rate ν.13
Proposition 5 (Eﬀect of p and ν on growth rate)
Everything else equal, the economy’s growth rate decreases with the hazard rate p and the
growth rate of the cohort size ν.
The proof is given in the appendix.
6 Improvements in the Healthcare Technology
We are particularly interested in how the aggregate economy is aﬀected by changes in
the healthcare technology. As discussed earlier, the healthcare technology (8) exhibits two
parameters inﬂuencing the hazard rate p of the households. A decline in the parameter
pmax reduces the hazard rate that households face without investments in healthcare. A
rise in the parameter ψ increases the reduction of the hazard rate that is purchased for any
given healthcare investment h. As stated in the following proposition, an improvement of
the healthcare technology either via a decrease in pmax or an increase in ψ leads to a higher
rate of growth.
Proposition 6 (Improvements in the healthcare technology)




















13 Note that we hold ν ﬁxed when taking the derivative with respect to p. This implies that the birth rate
varies. Deﬁning the measure of newborns at time t by βN(t), where β reﬂects the birth rate, we obtain in
equilibrium that ν = β − p
⋆. Inserting this expression into g(p) as given in (18), it can be easily veriﬁed














The proof of Proposition 6, given in the appendix, shows that better healthcare technology
aﬀects the equilibrium growth rate g⋆ in two ways. First, there is a direct eﬀect. Ceteris
paribus, a decrease in pmax or an increase in ψ lowers the hazard rate p⋆, which implies
an increase in the equilibrium growth rate g⋆, as detailed in Section 5. Second, there is
an indirect eﬀect. When the healthcare technology is more productive, households invest a
higher share of income in healthcare implying an increase in h⋆. This additional reduction
in the hazard rate p⋆ further increases the equilibrium growth rate g⋆.
An important insight is conveyed by the conditions in Proposition 6 (ii). In an interior
equilibrium (h⋆ > 0), the magnitude by which a marginal improvement in the healthcare
technology increases expected lifetimes is determined by the households’ intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. The higher is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the larger is
the eﬀect of a marginal improvement in the healthcare technology on life expectancy. The
magnitude of the eﬀect is independent of whether the improvement results from a decrease
in pmax or an increase in ψ. However, the channel by which the healthcare technology
improves is crucial for the eﬀect on equilibrium healthcare expenditures h⋆: An increase
in longevity via a marginal increase in ψ incurs higher costs in equilibrium relative to a
marginal decrease in pmax.
6.1 Magnitude of eﬀects
To get an idea of the magnitude of the comparative static eﬀects from an improvement in the
healthcare technology we provide a numerical example. Table 1 illustrates the case where
pmax = 1/60 (implying 60 years of expected lifetime without healthcare investments) and
improvements in the productivity of healthcare expenditures ψ are such that – in equilibrium
– life expectancy is increased in steps of 5 years. For each state of technology characterized
by pmax and ψ, the table gives the corresponding equilibrium levels of healthcare spending
h⋆, the expected lifetime T = 1/p⋆ and the corresponding growth rate of the economy g⋆.
For all parameters we choose plausible real world values.14
We observe that the growth rate g⋆ increases very little in response to a higher productivity
of healthcare investments ψ accompanied by a higher expected lifetime T. The relative
14 For the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ we follow Murphy and Topel (2003) who suggest a value
of ε = (u
′(c)c)/u(c) = 0.346 which is also used by Becker et al. (2005). For our instantaneous utility
function (4) this translates into σ = 1.529, which we round to σ = 1.5. The remaining parameters are
set to α = 0.33, r = 3.5%, ρ = 2%, ν = 0. In addition, we normalize the wage level at time t = 0 to
w(0) = 1. A sensitivity analysis (available upon request) shows that our results are qualitatively very
robust to reasonable changes in the parameter values.
15pmax 1/60
ψ 0.97% 1.06% 1.13% 1.19% 1.25% 1.30% 1.34%
h⋆ 0 12.12% 21.05% 27.91% 33.33% 37.74% 41.38%
T = 1/p⋆ 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
g⋆ 2.179% 2.187% 2.194% 2.200% 2.204% 2.208% 2.212%
∆g⋆/g⋆ 0% 0.383% 0.310% 0.255% 0.212% 0.179 0.153%
U(0) 102.03 102.29 102.80 103.46 104.20 104.98 105.77
∆UT(0)/U(0) 0% 0.249% 0.502% 0.640% 0.713% 0.746% 0.755%
∆Up(0)/U(0) 0% 0.152% 0.419% 0.569% 0.651% 0.692% 0.707%
∆Ug(0)/U(0) 0% 0.098% 0.083% 0.071% 0.062% 0.054% 0.047%
Table 1: Equilibrium values for healthcare expenditures h⋆, life expectancy T, growth rate
g⋆ and lifetime utility U(0) for diﬀerent parameters of ψ.
increase of the growth rate induced by an additional ﬁve years of expected lifetime is shown
in the row labeled ∆g⋆/g⋆ and ranges between 0.383% for an increase of expected lifetime
from 60 to 65 and 0.153% for an increase in expected lifetime from 85 to 90 years.
The row of Table 1 labeled U(0) shows the expected lifetime utility of an individual house-
hold born at time t = 0 (with the wage at birth normalized to unity). We observe that
households living in an economy with a better healthcare technology (and everything else
equal) live longer and enjoy higher expected lifetime utility. The relative increase is shown
in the row labelled ∆UT(0)/U(0) and ranges between 0.249% for an increase of expected
lifetime from 60 to 65 and 0.755% for an increase in expected lifetime from 85 to 90 years.
Our previous analysis showed that these utility gains of longevity originate from two dif-
ferent sources: (i) the direct utility of a longer lifetime and (ii) the utility gain associated
with a higher growth rate. Decomposing the relative utility gain of ﬁve year increases in
longevity into these two sources, the row labeled ∆Up(0)/U(0) shows the relative utility
increase stemming from the ﬁrst source. More precisely, it captures the relative utility gain
of a household that experiences an additional ﬁve years of expected lifetime but the same
growth rate of the economy.15 The residuum to the total relative utility gain from increased
life expectancy is presented in the last row labeled ∆Ug(0)/U(0). It reﬂects the utility gain
due to the increase in the growth rate compared to the economy in which households live
ﬁve years less in expectation.16 We observe that most of the utility gain is due to the direct
15 One may consider two hypothetical households. Household 1’s expected lifetime, 1/p1, is 5 years higher
than the one of household 2, 1/p2. Then ∆Up(0)/U(0) represents the relative utility diﬀerence between
these two households given they both experience growth rate g(p2).
16 The results change minimally when ∆Up(0)/U(0) is derived as the residuum and ∆Ug(0)/U(0) is calculated
as follows. Both households exhibit the same life expectancy 1/p2, but household 1 experiences the growth
rate g(p1) and household 2 the growth rate g(p2), where 1/p1 − 1/p2 = 5 years.
16pmax 1/60 1/65 1/70 1/75 1/80 1/85 1/90
ψ 0.5%
h⋆ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T = 1/p⋆ 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
g⋆ 2.179% 2.187% 2.194% 2.200% 2.204% 2.208% 2.212%
∆g⋆/g⋆ 0% 0.383% 0.310% 0.255% 0.212% 0.179 0.153%
U(0) 102.03 106.79 111.23 115.38 119.28 122.93 126.38
∆UT(0)/U(0) 0% 4.662% 4.157% 3.734% 3.375% 3.067% 2.800%
∆Up(0)/U(0) 0% 4.560% 4.071% 3.661% 3.311% 3.012% 2.752%
∆Ug(0)/U(0) 0% 0.102% 0.086% 0.073% 0.063% 0.055% 0.048%
Table 2: Equilibrium values for healthcare expenditures h⋆, life expectancy T, growth rate
g⋆ and lifetime utility U(0) for diﬀerent parameters of pmax.
eﬀect of a longer expected lifetime and only a small fraction is attributable to the increase
of the growth rate.
Overall, the utility gains from longevity due to a higher productivity of healthcare invest-
ments seem rather limited. This may change when we consider ﬁve-year increases of expected
lifetime resulting from decreases in pmax, as – according to Proposition 6 – a marginal de-
crease in pmax induces a smaller rise in the healthcare expenditures compared to a marginal
increase in ψ. In Table 2 we demonstrate the case where ψ is so low that no investments in
healthcare are always optimal and, thus, increases of expected lifetime solely stem from the
reduction of pmax. As a consequence, improvements in longevity come without direct costs
to households. We concentrate on this polar case for two reasons. First, it highlights the
diﬀerence between increases in longevity via the two diﬀerent channels, as utility gains are
highest if longevity increases come without healthcare costs. Second, this case is method-
ologically identical to models with exogenous changes in longevity and, hence, allows us to
compare our results with this literature. Apart from ψ and pmax all parameter values are
identical to the example shown in Table 1 (see footnote 14).
We observe the same growth rates as in the previous example, as in our model the growth
rate only depends on the equilibrium life expectancy p⋆ and the other exogenous parame-
ters. However, the relative utility gain from a ﬁve-year increase in expected lifetime is now
substantially higher (more than threefold). As a consequence, the share of the utility gain
attributable to an increasing growth rate is now even smaller compared to the scenario
where the longevity increase stems from improvements in the productivity of healthcare
investments.
Thus, our model indicates that improvements in healthcare technology may have a large
17impact on overall welfare. However, this impact is rather driven by increasing lifetime utility
due to an increasing life expectancy than by the eﬀects of longevity on economic growth.
Therefore, our model supports the assumption (implicitly) made by several papers on the
welfare aspects of longevity (see, for example, Becker et al. 2005 and Jones and Klenow
2010) that the welfare gains from an increase in longevity are not well reﬂected in the
GDP-growth rate. However, our numerical example also shows that the magnitude of the
welfare gains due to a higher expected lifetime strongly depends on the channel by which
this increase in longevity is reached, and, in particular, by the accompanied rise in health
expenditures. Welfare gains are considerably higher if increases in expected lifetime come as
windfall gains from a decrease in the maximal hazard rate pmax together with no healthcare
expenditures compared to improvements in the productivity of healthcare treatment ψ.
6.2 Welfare gains between 1960 and 2000
The previous discussion indicates that the welfare consequences of increased longevity de-
pend substantially on the healthcare costs associated with it. To elicit the welfare gains that
have been realized by the longevity increases over the last decades, we apply our model to
the development of healthcare expenditures and average lifetime between the years 1960 and
2000 for seven world regions.17 The results for all seven regions and details on the data for
the numerical exercise are given in the appendix. In the following discussion, we concentrate
on a developed (North America) and a developing (South Asia) region.
The levels of h given in Table 3 are the observed health expenditures per GDP multiplied
by 3/4. This factor has been chosen for the following reason: On the one hand, h in our
model is the share of labor income spent on healthcare rather than the share of total GDP.
Assuming a labor share of 2/3, we divide data on health expenditures per GDP by this
number. On the other hand, not all health expenditures are eﬀective in prolonging life.
Assuming that half of the expenditures aﬀect the individuals’ life expectancy leads to the
factor of 3/4 given above. We have no data on health expenditures for South Asia in 1960,
which we estimate to be (close to) zero.18 In line with our theoretical model, we assume
that increases in average lifetime stem from improvements of the healthcare technology.
This implies that the growth rate increases accordingly. We assume that between 1960 and
1980 the respective world region experienced growth of income per capita consistent with
the healthcare expenditure and average lifetime data of 1960, and between 1980 and 2000
income per capita grew consistently with 2000 data. Using the parameters α = 0.33, σ = 1.5
17 To be able to compare our results with previous studies, we use the original data set of Becker et al. (2005),
which we amend by data on healthcare expenditures.
18 As further discussed in the appendix, our qualitative results are very robust with respect to variations of
the level of health expenditures.
18Region N. America N. Am. (exo. p) S. Asia
Year 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000
T = 1/p⋆ 69.9 77.3 69.9 77.3 44.0 62.7
h⋆ 3.9% 9.8% 0% 0% 0% 3.1%
g⋆ 2.44% 2.45% 2.44% 2.45% 2.38% 2.45%
r 3.69% 3.69% 3.74%
ν 1.14% 1.14% 2.22%
g∅ 2.44% 2.44% 2.42%
ˆ g 2.57% 2.65% 3.30%
∆U/U(1960) 43.25% 46.29% 71.04%
∆UT/∆U 11.24% 17.06% 47.43%
∆Ug/∆U 0.67% 0.64% 3.19%
∆Up/∆U 10.57% 16.43% 44.24%
Table 3: Utility gains for North America and South Asia from 1960 to 2000.
and ρ = 0.02 of the previous numerical example and normalizing the wage level in 1960 to
1, the depreciation rate has been adjusted such that the simulated average growth rate in
each region is identical to the observed average growth rate between 1960 and 2000.
Table 3 shows the results. In North America average life expectancy increased from 69.9 in
1960 to 77.3 years in 2000. At the same time the healthcare expenditures (in percentage of
labor income) increased from 3.9% to 9.8%. In South Asia, life expectancy rose from 44.0 in
1960 to 62.7 years in 2000. Healthcare expenditures equaled 3.1% in 2000 and are estimated
(close to) zero for 1960. Over this 40 year period the average annual growth rate of income
per capita equaled 2.44% for North America and 2.42% for South Asia. Population grew by
an average annual rate of 1.14% in North America and 2.22% in South Asia.
We are now interested in the utility gain of a person born under the conditions of the year
2000 relative to a person born in 1960 in the same region. The result is given in the row
labeled ∆U/U(1960): In North America the expected lifetime utility increased by 43.25%.
Of course, due to economic growth a person born in 2000 was better oﬀ than a person born
in 1960 even without increases in life expectancy. To elicit which share of the utility gain
is attributable to the increase in average lifetime, we deduct the utility gain that a person
would enjoy if born in 2000 while expected lifetime remained unchanged relative to 1960.
We ﬁnd that a share of 11.24% of the total welfare gains in North America between 1960
and 2000 is attributable to the increase in average lifetime (see row labeled ∆UT/∆U). The
last two rows recall our previous ﬁnding that almost all the utility gains originate directly
from a longer expected lifetime (∆Up/∆U) rather than indirectly via an increased growth
rate of GDP per capita (∆Ug/∆U). The row labelled ˆ g reports the average annual “full-
19income” growth rate of GDP per capita that would have been necessary between 1960 and
2000 to give a person born in 2000 the same utility without the increase in longevity. The
table indicates that the growth rate had to be 2.57% instead of 2.44% to compensate for
the utility gain of increased expected lifetime.
To get an idea of the role played by healthcare expenditures, we contrast our results with
a thought experiment in which longevity increases come without costs. The results are
reported in the second column headed “North America (exogenous p)”. Without healthcare
expenditures the total relative welfare gains between 1960 and 2000 would be higher and
17.06% of these larger welfare gains would be due to increased longevity, an increase of more
than 50% relative to the real world scenario. This is also reﬂected in the higher full-income
growth rate of 2.65% compared to 2.57% when healthcare costs are considered.
These results might indicate that relative welfare gains due to increased longevity are con-
siderably higher in developing countries where relatively cheap measures (such as better
sanitation, better access to standard vaccines, etc.) involve relatively high increases in pmax
compared to developed countries where further increases in average lifetime are mainly due
to improvements of expensive cutting-edge medical treatment. As an example for a devel-
oping region, we report in the third column of Table 3 the relative welfare gain of 71.04%
in South Asia between 1960 and 2000 of which almost half (47.43%) are attributable to
increases in life expectancy. We obtain a full-income growth rate of 3.3% while on average
GDP per capita only grew by 2.42% per annum in this region.
For the period between 1960 and 2000, Becker et al. (2005) report full-income growth rates
for North America of 2.7% and for South Asia of 3.1%. Further they calculate shares of
welfare improvements due to mortality reductions compared to overall welfare improve-
ments between 1960 and 2000 for North America of about 12% and for South Asia of
about 30.4%. They conclude that when additionally considering longevity improvements
the world’s welfare inequality has become lower than solely GDP-based measures suggest.
The re-examination of their data set in light of our theoretical model supports this con-
clusion. However, the numbers given in Table 3 suggest an even stronger convergence of
welfare for two reasons. First, in contrast to Becker et al. (2005), we consider a growth
model and take lifetime utility and not instantaneous utility as yardstick for welfare. The
strong diminishing returns of consumption due to the concavity of the instantaneous welfare
function (3) lead to a lower lifetime utility increase in high-income countries compared to
low-income countries for the same average growth rate of income per capita. Second, in our
model we explicitly consider costs of improvements in life expectancy.19 As a consequence,
19 While Becker et al. (2005) did not include healthcare expenditures in their analysis, they conjectured that
this would make a diﬀerence in the relative welfare gains from longevity increases enjoyed by developed
and developing countries.
20welfare gains for a given increase in longevity are higher if this increase is accompanied by
no or small changes in healthcare expenditures.
7 Ineﬃcient Market Equilibria
An important policy question is whether the market equilibrium, as analyzed in the previous
sections, is eﬃcient. In fact, the model comprises three externalities that are not accounted
for in the market equilibrium.
First, there is a “learning-by-investing” externality (Romer 1986). At any time, ﬁrms take
the technological level A(t) of the economy as given, neglecting the positive spillovers the
employment of capital exerts on the economy’s production output Y (t) via an increase in
the technological level. As is well known, this leads to an ineﬃciently low level of asset
holdings that could be corrected, for example, by subsidizing household savings.
Second, there are two additional externalities associated with healthcare expenditures. To
identify these, we take the total derivative of an individual’s lifetime utility with respect to



























The term y(p) ≡ r+p−g represents the diﬀerence between the return of annuities a and the
economy’s growth rate g. The function F(h) constitutes the individual’s ﬁrst-order condi-
tion with respect to healthcare expenditures (12). In the decentralized market equilibrium
with an interior solution the ﬁrst-order condition equals zero. The remaining two sum-
mands in brackets denote the impact of healthcare investments on the equilibrium return
for annuities, a, and the economy’s growth rate, g, which the households do not take into
account. The existence of these two externalities is independent of the positive spillovers
from capital accumulation. The reason is that internalizing the “learning-by-investing” ex-
ternality increases the eﬀective interest rate. The additional two externalities, however, do
not disappear for any the level of the interest rate. They occur because households do not
take into account that increased longevity reduces the equilibrium return of annuities (for
a given interest rate) and increases the economy’s growth rate via the age structure of
the economy, as described in Section 3. The externality of healthcare spending on the rate
of return for annuities a, reﬂected by the expression da/dh(1/x(p) − 1/y(p)), is negative
because da/dh = −ψ and y(p)−x(p) = σ(r −ρ)−g > 0.20 Hence, households tend to over-
20 The term y(p)−x(p) represents the diﬀerence between the growth rate of individual household consumption
and the growth rate of per capita consumption, which is positive due to equation (17a).
21invest in healthcare (Philipson and Becker 1998). However, the last expression in brackets
in (21) representing the externality on the economy’s equilibrium growth rate g is positive
implying under-investment in healthcare. Thus, a decrease in healthcare expenditures has
a positive eﬀect on the rate of return from annuities a, but a negative eﬀect on g and vice
versa. Whether the equilibrium level of healthcare expenditures is ineﬃcient in the sense
that there exists a steady state in which all households are better oﬀ by investing either
more or less in healthcare depends on the magnitude of the welfare losses associated with
the two opposed externalities.
All terms in brackets in equation (21) are independent of time except for the last term
that reﬂects the increase of the wage-level of a generation born at time s due to a marginal
change in the growth rate. This term increases with s,21 implying that the welfare loss due
to a lower than optimal steady-state growth rate is larger the later a household is born.
Even small changes in the economy’s growth rate g have huge welfare eﬀects for generations
living in the far distant future. As the term is linear in s, there exists some ¯ s for any
decrease in healthcare expenditures such that all generations born at s > ¯ s are worse oﬀ,
although early generations may beneﬁt. Thus, it cannot occur that healthcare expenditures
in the market equilibrium are ineﬃciently high in the sense that there exists a lower level
of healthcare expenditures for which all households born at s ≥ 0 would be better oﬀ.
Whether healthcare expenditures are ineﬃciently low in the market equilibrium depends on
the relative strengths of the two externalities for the generation born at s = 0. Proposition
7 gives a condition for which under-investment in healthcare occurs.
Proposition 7 (Ineﬃcient levels of healthcare expenditures)
For interior levels of healthcare expenditures, households invest ineﬃciently low amounts in
healthcare in the market equilibrium if dg(p)/dp < 1 − y(p)/x(p).
The proof is given in the appendix.
8 Spillover Eﬀects
In our model we have speciﬁed the “learning-by-investing” spillovers as a function of the
capital-stock per worker. Although this is a reasonable assumption, one may ask how our




LF(t) + (1 − η)LH(t)
, η ∈ [0,1] , (22)
21 Note that by setting w(t) = exp[gt], we normalize the wage rate at t = 0 to unity. This implies that we
compare the lifetime utility of all generations born at s ≥ 0.
22which captures all spillover magnitudes between the two polar cases η = 1 representing our
previous model and η = 0 reﬂecting spillovers depending on capital per capita A(t) = k(t).
While condition (13) for the individual household’s optimal choice of healthcare expenditures
remains unchanged, as households take prices as given, the new speciﬁcation of A(t) aﬀects
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− δ , (23a)





LF(t) + (1 − η)LH(t)
 1−α
. (23b)
Given the equilibrium levels of h(s), LH(t) can still be expressed by (7). For η < 1 the interest
rate declines with the level of healthcare expenditures, as LH(t) increases and LF(t) =
N(t) − LH(t) declines. On the one hand, a decline in labor employed in consumption-good
production reduces the marginal productivity of capital. On the other hand, for η > 0 the
technological level A(t) increases, as the capital intensity in consumption-good production
increases which ampliﬁes the learning externality.22 The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second
implying a negative inﬂuence of health-care expenditures on the interest rate. Note that in
the basic version of our model, which corresponds to η = 1, the two eﬀects cancel out leading
to the constant interest rate r(t) = α−δ. This interest rate also results in the general set-up
if no healthcare expenditures are optimal in the market equilibrium for all generations, i.e.
h(s) = 0 for all s, implying LF(t) = N(t) and LH(t) = 0 at all times t.
In the following, we restrict attention to the steady state market equilibrium in which
the interest rate r(t) = r is constant. For this to hold, optimal healthcare expenditures h
have to be constant implying that also the hazard rate p and the population growth rate
˙ N(t)/N(t) = ν are constant. We obtain for the interest rate and the wage rate in steady
state23





− δ , (24a)
22 An alternative interpretation of the eﬀect of healthcare expenditures on A(t) would be that better health
increases the workers’ productivity. A more precise implementation of this idea would specify A(t) as a
function of L
H(t), L
F(t), pmax, ψ, and K(t). A simple way to augment our basic model in this direction
is to multiply A(t), as given in Section 2.1, by a constant ζ(pmax,ψ) that increases with ψ and declines
with pmax. This would not change our analysis substantially but leads to larger eﬀects of improvements
in the healthcare technology on the growth rate. A more general way is to include the average health
status reﬂected by average lifetime into the model. Such an extension yields similar eﬀects of health on
production as described in the main text. On the one hand, better health increases the productivity of
capital in consumption-good production. On the other hand, if this higher level of health incurs healthcare
expenditures, the labor force decreases leading to a lower marginal productivity of capital.
23 We indicate steady state values in the general spillover setting by a bar and, where applicable, use h as










Inserting ¯ a(h,p) = ¯ r(h) + p into (13) determines the healthcare expenditures in the steady
state market equilibrium.
Proposition 8 (Existence of steady state healthcare level)
Given equation (22) for the technological level of the economy, there exists a steady state
equilibrium level of healthcare expenditures, ¯ h⋆.
The proof is given in the appendix. In contrast to the basic model, the aggregate dynamics
in the steady state depends not only on the hazard rate p but also on the level of healthcare
expenditures h.
Proposition 9 (Steady state aggregate dynamics)
Given equation (22) for the technological level of the economy, the steady state dynamics of
the aggregate economy
(i) is characterized by:
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δ − ν − σ [¯ r(h) − ρ]
 2
+ 4¯ x(h,p)(p + ν) ,
where ¯ x(h,p) ≡ ¯ r(h) + p − σ(¯ r(h) − ρ).
The proof is given in the appendix. Equation (9) shows that not only the hazard rate p
matters for the steady state growth rate, as it is the case in the basic model, but also
the level of healthcare expenditures by which it is achieved. If there are no healthcare
investments in steady state, ¯ h⋆ = 0, we are back in the basic model implying ¯ g(0,p) =
¯ g(0,pmax) = g(pmax). By virtue of Proposition 5, for ¯ h⋆ = 0 a decreasing p = pmax leads
to an increasing equilibrium growth rate ∂¯ g(0,p)/∂p < 0. This does not necessarily hold if
the reduction in p is accompanied by an increase in h. We obtain for the total derivative of














The ﬁrst term is positive, as ∂¯ g(h,p)/∂p < 0 (Proposition 5) and dp/dh < 0. The sign of the
second term is ambiguous, as the sign of ∂¯ g(h,p)/∂¯ r(h) is ambiguous and d¯ r(h)/dh < 0. In
contrast to our basic model, it is now possible that the steady state growth rate declines in
response to an increase in longevity. This happens, if ∂¯ g(h,p)/∂r > 0 and suﬃciently large
so that the second term outweighs the ﬁrst. Thus, the diﬀerence between improvements in
longevity originating from increases in pmax accompanied by zero healthcare expenditures
and those from an increase of ψ is even further pronounced compared to the basic model.
In the basic model, both types of longevity increases had (small) positive growth eﬀects but
substantial welfare diﬀerences. With the alternative spillover mechanism and η < 1 we may
even experience negative growth eﬀects in response to longevity increases.
This also aﬀects the ineﬃciency result given in Proposition 7. It is now possible that the
steady state investments in healthcare are ineﬃciently high in the sense that all households
born at s ≥ 0 were better oﬀ in a steady state where all households invest less in healthcare.
Proposition 10 (Ineﬃcient levels of healthcare expenditures)
Given equation (22) for the technological level of the economy, in an interior steady state,
healthcare expenditures ¯ h⋆ are ineﬃciently high if d¯ g(h,p)/dh|h=¯ h⋆ < 0.
The proof of Proposition 10, provided in the appendix, shows that under the given condition
both externalities connected with healthcare investments – on the return of annuities and
on the steady state growth rate – have a negative impact on expected lifetime utility.
Finally, we illustrate how the results of our numerical example given in Section 6.2 change
under the alternative spillover speciﬁcation. More precisely, we show results for η ranging
from 1 (which corresponds to our previous setup) to 0.9. In addition, we also show the results
for a hypothetical North America in which no healthcare expenditures are undertaken and
all improvements in longevity solely stem from an increase in pmax. In this case the new
speciﬁcation of the spillover eﬀect collapses to the basic model for any value of η. Thus, the
results are identical to the second row in Table 3.
For both values of η < 1 given in Table 4, we observe that the steady state growth rate
declines in response to the increase of the healthcare expenditures from 3.9% of labor income
in 1960 to 9.8% in 2000. The eﬀect is more pronounced the smaller is η. As in Section 6.2,
we adjust the depreciation rate such that the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita
matches the observed value of 2.44%. This implies that the growth rate drops from 2.49% in
1960 to 2.39% in 2000 for η = 0.95 and from 2.55% in 1960 to 2.34% in 2000 for η = 0.9. In
25Region North America
T T(1960) = 69.9 T(2000) = 77.3
h 0 h(1960) = 3.9% h(2000) = 9.8%
η ∈ [0,1] 1 0.95 0.9
r(1960) 3.69% 3.69% 3.73% 3.76%
r(2000) 3.69% 3.69% 3.65% 3.62%
g⋆(1960) 2.44% 2.44% 2.49% 2.55%
g⋆(2000) 2.45% 2.45% 2.39% 2.34%
ˆ g 2.65% 2.57% 2.54% 2.51%
∆U/U(1960) 46.29% 43.25% 41.16% 39.11%
∆UT/∆U 17.06% 11.24% 4.18% −3.48%
∆Ug/∆U 0.64% 0.67% −7.16% −15.64%
∆Up/∆U 16.43% 10.57% 11.33% 12.16%
Table 4: Utility gains for North America from 1960 to 2000 for diﬀerent values of η.
contrast to the results in Section 6.2, the welfare eﬀects of these changes in the growth rate
may be substantial, as can be seen in the row labeled ∆Ug/∆U. In fact, while for η = 0.95
the total welfare gain attributable to increases in longevity is still positive, for η = 0.9
the utility loss from the decreasing growth rate outweighs the direct utility increase due to
increased average lifetime so that the welfare gain between 1960 and 2000 had been higher
by 3.48% without the increase in life expectancy.
These results emphasize that the growth eﬀects of increases in longevity may drastically
depend on the associated healthcare costs. In any case, welfare and growth eﬀects are the
highest if the increases in longevity stem from a decrease of the maximal hazard rate pmax
together with zero healthcare expenditures. If increases in longevity are accompanied by
increases in healthcare expenditures, as is always the case for increases in the eﬃciency
of healthcare ψ, the growth eﬀects of increased longevity are either small (in case of our
basic model) or may even be negative (in case of our alternative spillover speciﬁcation). In
fact, the negative growth eﬀects may even outweigh the direct utility gains from increased
longevity. At least for the richest regions like North America or Western Europe, this might
challenge the conclusions of Becker et al. (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2010) who argue
that recent increases in longevity induced non-negligible positive welfare gains.
It is important to recognize that the negative welfare eﬀects in the case of η = 0.9 result
from the negative externality of healthcare expenditures on the economy’s growth rate. In
general, these externalities call for governmental action. In most countries, the healthcare
system is heavily regulated. Usually health insurance systems result in ineﬃciently high
26demand for healthcare implying higher healthcare spending relative to the pure market
equilibrium considered in our model (see, for example, Manning et al. 1987, Cutler and
Zeckhauser 2000, Cutler 2002, Gruber 2008). As a consequence, when government subsidies
for healthcare are taken into account welfare losses may be even higher than those shown
for the case η = 0.9 in Table 4.
Which model speciﬁcation applies is an important empirical question. To answer this ques-
tion, one could test whether the return on capital is aﬀected by healthcare expenditures.
One of the challenges of such an exercise would be to isolate healthcare expenditures that
prolong life from those that do not. For the existing empirical literature, our model is consis-
tent with recent results suggesting that the long-run eﬀects of longevity on GDP per capita
are either moderately positive (Ashraf et al. 2008), insigniﬁcant or even negative (Acemoglu
and Johnson 2007). By contrast, many (earlier) contributions to this literature usually found
substantial positive eﬀects of longevity on economic growth.24 In an attempt to reconcile
these diﬀerent ﬁndings, Aghion et al. (2010) argue that both the level of life expectancy and
the increase in life expectancy have to be considered and ﬁnd that both have signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀects on per-capita GDP growth. However, they also indicate that when restricting
attention to OECD-countries in the post-1960 period, the eﬀects weaken. Our model allows
for two diﬀerent interpretations of this result. First, in our basic model the growth rate is
increasing and concave with respect to longevity. Hence, the model predicts that the eﬀect
of an increase in life expectancy on the growth rate becomes smaller the higher is the level of
longevity. Second, in the alternative spillover speciﬁcation the growth rate of the economy
may decline in response to higher healthcare costs. The longevity increases in the developed
countries in the recent past have mainly originated from “big medicine” involving expensive
and intensive personal interventions rather than the eradication of infectious diseases with
relatively cheap hygienic measures (see, for example, Becker et al. 2005, Cutler et al. 2006).
As a consequence, our theory would predict smaller growth and welfare gains derived from
increased life expectancy.25
9 Conclusion
We developed an overlapping generations endogenous growth model in continuous time to
investigate the link between life expectancy, which is the result of endogenous investments
24 See, for example, Gallup and Sachs (2001), Bhargava et al. (2001), Barro (1996), Azomahou et al. (2009),
Lorentzen et al. (2008). Only very few studies ﬁnd small negative or no eﬀects of longevity of growth such
as Caselli et al. (1996). An overview can be found in Bloom et al. (2004).
25 Aghion et al. (2010) hypothesize that gains in life expectancy at young age mattered more than gains in
life expectancy at old age supposedly for reasons of labor market participation and education. We do not
refute these reasons but emphasize the importance of healthcare expenditures associated with the increase
in expected lifetime.
27in healthcare, economic growth and welfare. We ﬁnd that improvements in the healthcare
technology increase both life expectancy and steady state growth rates of the economy.
However, simulation results suggest that the magnitude of the latter eﬀect is small, even
for substantial improvements in the healthcare technology. Hence, for the most part welfare
gains stem from an increase in average lifetime directly. The magnitude of the welfare gains,
however, strongly depends on the channel by which the healthcare technology improves.
A reduction of the baseline mortality yields higher welfare gains than an increase in the
productivity of healthcare expenditures. Our ﬁnding tends to be reinforced when considering
more general speciﬁcations of the spillover eﬀects in the production sector.
This has implications for the future development of healthcare expenditures and welfare.
Several authors have argued that the recent increases in longevity in the developed countries
are mainly the result of “big medicine” rendering healthcare expenditures more productive in
treating life-threatening diseases rather than a decrease in the baseline mortality level via
cheap measures such as improved sanitation. Extrapolating this development, our model
suggests that the prospects for future welfare gains from increased longevity are rather
modest.
We have shown that the decentralized market solution exhibits several externalities that
call for government action. It would be an interesting venue for future research to augment
the model with realistic features of national health systems to examine their eﬀects on
growth and welfare and to be able to evaluate potential policy interventions. Other inter-
esting extensions would be to incorporate age-dependent mortality, retirement decisions or
endogenous fertility. Finally, we only considered exogenous improvements in the healthcare
technology. Endogenizing these improvements is a further challenge for future research.
28Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, the corner solution h(s) = 1 cannot be an optimal solution, as consumption and
lifetime utility would drop to zero, while both are positive for any value h(s) ∈ [0,1).









re-arrange terms to yield26
1 − h(s) =
σ(σ − 1)(ρ + pmax) − (σ − 1)2a(s)
σψ
− (σ − 1)h(s) . (A.1)
Both, the left-hand and the right-hand side are linear equations in h(s), which intersect
at most once and are identical in the special case that σ = 2 and σ(σ − 1)(ρ + pmax) −
(σ − 1)2a(s) = σψ hold simultaneously. This special case is precluded, however, as the
latter condition contradicts the necessary condition (1 − σ)a(s) + σ(ρ + p(s)) > 0 for all
p(s) ∈ [pmax,pmax − ψ] for the household’s problem to be well deﬁned.























(σ − 1)2˜ x2 
h(s)







(1 − σ)a(s) + σ
 
ρ + pmax − ψh(s)
  
. As a consequence, an interior optimal
solution can only exist for σ ∈ (1,2) and thus h⋆(s) = 0 if σ ≥ 2. Even for σ ∈ (1,2), the




< 0 for all
h(s) ∈ [0,1). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Aggregate dynamics: To derive the aggregate system dynamics, we evaluate equation
(11b) in the market equilibrium, aggregate according to equation (14) and diﬀerentiate
with respect to t:
˙ c(t) = x(p)
 
˙ k(t) + (1 − h) ˙ W(t)
 
, (A.3)




= 0 if h(s)  = 1. However, we have already seen
that h(s) = 1 cannot be an optimal solution.
29where W(t) ≡
  ∞
t w(t′)exp[−(r + p)(t′ − t)]dt′ denotes the net present value of the house-
hold’s lifetime labor income. Evaluating the budget constraint in the market equilibrium
and aggregating according to equation (14), we obtain
˙ b(t) = (r − ν)b(t) + (1 − h)w(t) − c(t) . (A.4)
Inserting ˙ W(t) and equation (A.4) into equation (A.3) yields equation (17a). We derive
(17b) by observing that in the market equilibrium w(t) = k(t)(1 −α)/(1 −h) and inserting
it into equation (A.4).
(ii) Balanced growth path: We prove the existence of a unique balanced growth path (BGP)
given a ﬁxed hazard rate p by contradiction. Suppose there is no BGP, but capital would
grow at a constant rate gk and consumption at the constant rate gc, with gk  = gc. Observe
in equations (17a) and (17b) that gc > gk implies gk = −∞ and gc < gk implies gc = −∞.
As both cases yield economically infeasible solutions the only remaining possibility is a BGP
with gc = gk = g.
To verify uniqueness and the second part of the proposition, we calculate the growth rate
g and show that under the given conditions it possesses the respective sign. First, we solve
the equations of motion for c(t)/k(t) given that gc = gk = g. As x(p)(p + ν) > 0 for all







(1 − δ − ν) − σ(r − ρ) +
 
[(1 − δ − ν) − σ(r − ρ)]
2 + 4x(p)(p + ν))
 
. (A.5)
This establishes the uniqueness of the BGP for a given value of p.





(1 − δ − ν) + σ(r − ρ) −
 
[(1 − δ − ν) − σ(r − ρ)]
2 + 4x(p)(p + ν)
 
. (A.6)
After some minor manipulations, we observe that the growth rate on the BGP is positive
if and only if x(p)(p + ν) < σ(r − ρ)(1 − δ − ν). Consequently, g < 0 if x(p)(p + ν) >
σ(r − ρ)(1 − δ − ν) and g = 0 if x(p)(p + ν) = σ(r − ρ)(1 − δ − ν). 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4































x(p) + p + ν + 1 − α
 
[1 − δ − ν − σ(r − ρ)]2 + 4(p + ν)x(p)
 
> 0 . (A.8)
For the second term constituting the indirect eﬀect via changes in the hazard rate p, we




x(p) + p + ν
 
[1 − δ − ν − σ(r − ρ)]2 + 4(p + ν)x(p)
< 0 . (A.9)
We can decompose dp⋆/dσ: dp⋆/dσ = dp⋆/dh⋆   dh⋆/dσ. By virtue of the healthcare tech-
nology, we ﬁnd that dp⋆/dh⋆ = −ψ < 0. We also know from Proposition 3 that the sign
of dh⋆/dσ is ambiguous, depending on the value of σ. Combining these ﬁndings yields the
claim of the proposition. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
























According to equation (15), ∂h⋆/∂ν = 0 implying that the second summand equals zero.








x(p) + p + v − (1 − α)
 
[1 − δ − ν − σ(r − ρ)]2 + 4(p + ν)x(p)
 
, (A.11)
which is smaller than zero if
[1 − δ − ν − σ(r − ρ)]
2 + 4(p + ν)x(p) > [x(p) + p + v − (1 − α)]
2
⇔ 4x(p)(1 − α) > 0 .
(A.12)
The last condition is always satisﬁed as α ∈ (0,1) and x(p) > 0. In addition, we know from
the proof of Proposition 4 that ∂g(p)/∂p < 0. 
31A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Diﬀerentiating the equilibrium level of healthcare expenditures, as given in (15), with




(σ − 1)[(1 − σ)r + σρ + pmax]






< 0 . (A.13)




























= 1 − ψ
dh⋆
dpmax
> 0 . (A.14b)


























< 0 . (A.15)
The inequalities follow from ∂g(p)/∂p < 0, as shown in Proposition 5.
(ii) Inserting the derivatives in (A.13) and the interior solution for h⋆ from (15) into
equations (A.14) gives dp⋆/dψ = −σ and dp⋆/dpmax = σ. Using (A.13), the condition




(σ − 1)[(1 − σ)r + σρ + pmax]
ψ2 ⇔ (1−σ)r+σρ+pmax−ψ > 0 . (A.16)
The latter condition is satisﬁed by assumption, as otherwise the households’ maximization
problem is not well deﬁned. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Healthcare investment in the market equilibrium is ineﬃciently low if dU(s)/dh|h=h⋆ > 0
for all s ≥ 0, as this would imply that a marginal increase in healthcare expenditures
would increase the lifetime utility of all generations born at s ≥ 0. For an interior solution















> 0 . (A.17)
32As da/dh = dp/dh = −ψ and dg(p)/dh = dg(p)/dp   dp/dh, (A.17) holds if the inequality
given in the proposition is satisﬁed. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
The individual household’s choice of optimal healthcare expenditures, as given in Proposi-
tion 1, remains unchanged by the new deﬁnition of the technological level of the economy.
As a consequence, the optimal level of healthcare in the steady state market equilibrium









Note that limh→1 ¯ F(h) = −∞, as the ﬁrst term remains ﬁnite27 and the second term diverges
to −∞ for h → 1. Thus, there exists an ¯ h⋆ with ¯ F(¯ h⋆) = 0 and d ¯ F(h)/dh|h=¯ h⋆ < 0 if
¯ F(h) > 0 for some h ∈ [0,1). Otherwise the optimal level of healthcare equals ¯ h⋆ = 0.

A.8 Proof of Proposition 9
(i) Aggregate dynamics: Using equations (24) instead of (6), we derive the aggregate steady
state dynamics analogously to part (i) of the proof of Proposition 2. To derive the equation of
motion for the capital stock k(t) insert b(t) = k(t) and ¯ w(h,t) = (1−α)/[α(1−h)] ¯ r(h)k(t).
(ii) Balanced growth path: The existence and uniqueness of a balanced growth path can be
shown as in part (ii) of the proof of Proposition 2. Replacing (1 − δ − ν) in equation (A.6)
by ¯ r(h)/α + δ(1 − α)/α − ν yields ¯ g(h,p) as given in the proposition. 
A.9 Proof of Proposition 10
Analogously to the proof of Proposition 7 the steady state level of healthcare expenditures
¯ h⋆ is ineﬃciently high if ∂U(s)/∂h|h=¯ h⋆ < 0 for all s ≥ 0. The equation corresponding to



























27 Note that (1−σ)¯ r(h)+σρ+p > 0 for all p ∈ [pmax,pmax−ψ] is necessary for the household’s maximization
problem to be well deﬁned.
33(A.19)
where ¯ y(h,p) = ¯ r(h)+p−¯ g(h,p). For an interior level of healthcare expenditures ¯ F(h) = 0.
Moreover, d¯ a(h,p)/dh = d¯ r(h)/dh+dp/dh < 0 and ¯ y(h,p)−¯ x(h,p) = σ[¯ r(h)−ρ]−¯ g(h,p) >
0. Thus, ∂U(s)/∂h|h=¯ h⋆ < 0 if d¯ g(h,p)/dh|h=¯ h⋆ < 0. 
A.10 Details on the numerical exercises
We use the original data set of Becker et al. (2005)28 and amend it by data on health
expenditures from 1960 and 2000. For the year 2000 the WHO29 provides data of healthcare
expenditures per GDP for all countries. Data for healthcare expenditures in 1960 is limited.
The OECD30 provides data on healthcare expenditures per capita in 1960 for some of their
members. In fact, complete data on healthcare expenditures is only available for North
America. Assuming the missing values to be zero, the data listed in Table 5 for healthcare
expenditures in 1960 is a lower bound for real healthcare expenditures. According to Becker
et al. (2005) income per capita is GDP per capita in 1996 international prices adjusted for
terms of trade (Penn World Tables 6.1). Data on life expectancy at birth is taken from the
World Bank Development Indicators. The average growth rate g∅ has been calculated from
income levels in 1960 and 2000. Accordingly, the average population growth rate ν has been
calculated from population data in 1960 and 2000. All regional aggregates are population
weighted sums of country data.
Table 5 shows the calculation results for seven world regions (E&CA: Europe and Central
Asia, EA&P: East Asia and Paciﬁc, LA&C: Latin America and the Caribbean, ME&NA:
Middle East and North Africa, NAM: North America, SASIA: South Asia and SSA: Sub-
Saharan Africa). NAM (exo) denotes a hypothetical North America in which no healthcare
expenditures are undertaken and increases in longevity solely stem from a decrease in pmax.
To estimate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the missing data on healthcare
expenditures in 1960, Table 6 shows the same calculations for the seven world regions but
with rather high estimates on the healthcare expenditures in 1960. We observe that our
results are robust to reasonable changes in the healthcare expenditures.
28 Available at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar05_data_becker.zip.
29 Available at http://www.who.int/gho/en/.
30 Available at http://puck.sourceoecd.org.
34Region E & CA EA & P LA & C ME & NA NAM NAM (exo) SASIA SSA
inc.(1960) 6810.37 1316.87 3459.36 1935.13 12379.8 12379.8 892.08 1470.48
inc.(2000) 18280.6 5866.24 7161.46 5524.89 32880.2 32880.2 2345.84 1573.02
T(1960) 67.99 42.05 56.26 47.89 69.89 69.89 44.04 40.55
T(2000) 76.22 70.71 70.46 68.94 77.25 77.25 62.73 46.02
h(1960) 1.64% 1.03% 0% 0% 3.91% 0% 0% 0%
h(2000) 6.02% 4.05% 4.97% 4.03% 9.77% 0% 3.12% 4.84%
r 3.70% 4.58% 3.33% 3.87% 3.69% 3.69% 3.74% 2.32%
ν 0.71% 1.64% 2.24% 2.54% 1.14% 1.14% 2.22% 2.73%
g∅ 2.47% 3.73% 1.82% 2.62% 2.44% 2.44% 2.42% 0.17%
g⋆(1960) 2.46% 3.69% 1.80% 2.59% 2.44% 2.44% 2.38% 0.15%
g⋆(2000) 2.47% 3.78% 1.84% 2.66% 2.45% 2.45% 2.45% 0.19%
ˆ g 2.65% 5.10% 2.25% 3.47% 2.57% 2.65% 3.30% 0.4%
∆U/U(1960) 45.82% 137.92% 41.83% 75.95% 43.25% 46.29% 71.04% 8.09%
∆UT/∆U 15.16% 53.91% 35.12% 45.74% 11.24% 17.06% 47.43% 75.32%
∆Ug/∆U 0.69% 3.26% 2.29% 3.02% 0.67% 0.64% 3.19% 7.74%
∆Up/∆U 14.47% 50.65% 32.89% 42.72% 10.57% 16.43% 44.24% 67.58%
Table 5: Numerical results for all seven world regions.
Region E & CA EA & P LA & C ME & NA NAM SASIA SSA
h(1960) 3.0% 1.5% 2.0% 1.5% 3.91% 1.0% 2.0%
h(2000) 6.02% 4.05% 4.97% 4.03% 9.77% 3.12% 4.84%
r 3.70% 4.58% 3.33% 3.87% 3.69% 3.74% 2.32%
ν 0.71% 1.64% 2.24% 2.54% 1.14% 2.22% 2.73%
g∅ 2.47% 3.73% 1.82% 2.62% 2.44% 2.42% 0.17%
g⋆(1960) 2.46% 3.69% 1.80% 2.59% 2.44% 2.38% 0.15%
g⋆(2000) 2.47% 3.78% 1.84% 2.66% 2.45% 2.45% 0.19%
ˆ g 2.67% 5.10% 2.28% 3.49% 2.57% 3.31% 0.44%
∆U/U(1960) 46.50% 138.30% 42.79% 76.84% 43.25% 71.62% 8.45%
∆UT/∆U 16.39% 54.04% 36.57% 46.37% 11.24% 47.85% 76.38%
∆Ug/∆U 0.68% 3.25% 2.19% 3.00% 0.67% 3.17% 7.43%
∆Up/∆U 15.71% 50.78% 34.38% 43.36% 10.57% 44.68% 68.95%
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis with respect to healthcare expenditures in 1960.
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